英伟达的安全团队在哪里?

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英伟达的安全团队在哪里?

内容来源:https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/14/where-was-nvidias-security-team/

内容总结:

英伟达首席安全官兼产品安全负责人于今年8月离职时,外界几乎没有理由关注此事。仅两个半月后,围绕其婚外情关系的质疑不断发酵,最终波及公司CEO黄仁勋本人——相关疑问最初涉及新加坡数据中心公司Megaspeed的一名高管,美国调查人员怀疑该公司将英伟达芯片转运至中国,随后又扩大至有关黄仁勋与两名英伟达员工存在两段不同婚外情的报道。

当时,在英伟达担任首席安全官四年、在公司总计任职七年的大卫·雷伯表示,他离职是出于健康原因。他在8月底的领英帖子中写道:“这不是我计划中的转折。但我知道什么必须放在第一位:家庭和健康。”他同时披露自己两年多前被诊断为早发性帕金森病。

接替雷伯的是萨沙·兹杰拉尔,此前在休斯敦的埃克森美孚工作17年,离职时担任高级IT经理,之后在Salesforce工作一年,又在网络安全公司ReversingLabs任职数年。兹杰拉尔周四未回应关于此次人事变动或安全团队所知情况的提问。

目前没有公开信息将雷伯或兹杰拉尔的职位变动与Megaspeed事件联系起来,但外界有理由追问:英伟达安全团队对政府对Megaspeed的审查以及黄仁勋的个人关系了解多少,是否有人提出过担忧。雷伯周四未回应提问,英伟达也未回答相关问询。

CEO与员工之间的关系通常由人力资源、法务和董事会处理,而非安全部门。但安全专家指出,任何婚外情——即便是办公室内的——都可能让外国情报机构获得对高管的把柄,前提是该高管希望此事不被曝光。而黄仁勋与Megaspeed一名高管的关系,涉及一家正接受联邦调查的公司,根本不属于办公室内部事务。(Megaspeed否认存在任何不当行为。)

尽管如此,发现线索并不容易。退休高级情报官员尼古拉斯·埃夫蒂米亚德斯表示,情报机构收集信息的方式——大部分通过日常对话而非黑客攻击——使安全团队尤其难以识别风险。他称自己培训过1000多名企业安全专业人员。

英伟达内部显然有人了解部分情况。据《纽约时报》本周早些时候报道,英伟达首席律师在一年多前就已就政府对Megaspeed的调查与官方接触。(英伟达表示公司定期与官员联系。)关于黄仁勋与员工关系的报道表明,同事们也知道这些关系,即便这种行为并未被英伟达行为准则明确禁止。《纽约时报》援引五名英伟达员工称,黄仁勋与一名直接向他汇报的副总裁存在关系,路透社随后援引两名知情人士报道了第二段关系。目前不清楚的是,这些信息是否传到了安全部门。

埃夫蒂米亚德斯曾在2020年撰写《中国间谍活动与战术》一书。他表示,即便信息传到了英伟达安全团队,安全团队的资源往往也有限。一方面,安全部门经常资金不足,因为与其他成本中心不同,它们不直接创造收入。他说,CEO用“一分钱不多给,只做合规”来回应安全团队的警告,这种情况惊人地普遍。

专家表示,许多公司对安全的定义也过于狭窄。企业调查公司Interfor International首席执行官唐·阿维夫和作家杰里米·胡雷维茨在《国会山报》的一篇评论文章中写道:“太多公司仍主要将安全视为保护设施、防范网络攻击和应对人身威胁的问题。”两人认为,“安全团队需要更加关注内部威胁,包括外国情报机构对高管和员工的培养、可疑的商业关系、利益冲突,以及通过可信的个人关系获取敏感信息的企图。”

不过,有些事情超出了任何团队的能力范围。埃夫蒂米亚德斯在泛泛而谈而非特指黄仁勋时提出了一个假设情景:一位CEO抱怨自己无法做某事,因为“我在跟一个不想做这件事的董事会斗争”。这就告诉情报资产谁是障碍。情报机构随后会问:“这里的卡点是谁?”然后寻找进入此人电子邮件和手机的方式。

竞争对手情报机构想要的往往不是技术,而是政策洞察,包括谁在推动修改出口规则、谁是最大的阻碍者。他说:“情报界往往像癌症一样。一旦进入体内,就会寻求扩散和延伸。”

埃夫蒂米亚德斯补充说,这套手法并不新鲜,“尤其是对中国而言”。任何与这个国家打交道的企业高管“都会告诉你,他们曾被接触过”。他说,还有“大量外交官的故事”,比如美国外交官走进酒店房间发现床上有一名女子。他说,与苏联时代间谍活动相比,更新的一点是,这些情报机构如今培养的关系往往持续数年,而非数周。

埃夫蒂米亚德斯表示,技术可以增强人力情报,并举例提到IMSI捕获器。这种设备模仿手机基站,使附近的手机连接至该设备。他说,基础版本成本约1000美元,可装入行李箱,但政府级型号价格要高得多。

埃夫蒂米亚德斯表示,目前无人知道这些设备是否被用于针对黄仁勋,黄仁勋的手机 presumably 经过加固,即便无法完全阻止入侵,也能检测到。但无论如何,随着董事会独立调查和联邦调查的推进,英伟达安全团队知道什么、是否本可以采取行动,应该会变得更加清晰。

与此同时,埃夫蒂米亚德斯表示,他希望整个事件能给美国业界敲响“警钟”。他说,美国业界对中国的手法大多“一无所知”。他估计:“我们已经在知识产权上损失了数万亿美元。无论我们自认为在做什么,都没有奏效。”

中文翻译:

今年8月,英伟达长期担任首席安全官兼产品安全负责人的高管辞职时,外界几乎没有理由注意到这件事。仅仅两个半月后,首席执行官黄仁勋本人也离开了公司,原因是他婚外情引发的质疑不断升温——最初涉及Megaspeed的一名高管,这家新加坡数据中心公司被美国调查人员怀疑将英伟达芯片转运至中国,随后又扩大到有关他与英伟达员工存在两段独立婚外情的报道。

当时,David Reber在英伟达担任首席安全官四年、总计任职七年,他表示因健康原因离职。“这不是我计划中的转折。但我知道什么必须放在第一位:家庭和健康,”他在8月底于LinkedIn上写道,并透露自己两年多前被诊断出早发性帕金森病。

接替Reber的是Saša Zdjelar,此前在休斯顿的埃克森美孚工作了17年,离职时担任高级IT经理,之后在Salesforce工作了一年,又在一家网络安全公司ReversingLabs工作了数年。Zdjelar周四未回应有关此次人事变动或安全团队了解哪些情况的提问。

目前没有公开信息将Reber或Zdjelar的职位变动与Megaspeed事件联系起来,但人们有理由好奇:英伟达安全团队对政府对Megaspeed的调查以及黄仁勋的感情关系了解多少,是否有人提出过担忧。Reber周四未回应提问。英伟达也未回答我们的相关问题。

首席执行官与员工之间的感情关系通常由人力资源、法务和董事会处理,而非安全部门。但安全专家表示,任何婚外情——即便是办公室内部的——都可能给外国情报机构提供把柄,用来要挟希望此事保密的髙管。而黄仁勋与Megaspeed一名高管的关系,根本不是办公室内部事务——Megaspeed是一家正受到联邦调查的公司。(Megaspeed否认有任何不当行为。)

尽管如此,发现线索并不容易。退休高级情报官员Nicholas Eftimiades表示,情报机构收集信息的方式——大部分通过日常对话而非黑客攻击——使得安全团队尤其难以识别风险。他称自己培训过1000多名企业安全专业人员。

英伟达内部显然有人了解部分情况。据《纽约时报》本周早些时候报道,英伟达的首席律师在一年多前就已就政府对Megaspeed的调查与政府方面进行沟通。(英伟达表示公司定期与官员联系。)有关黄仁勋与员工感情关系的报道表明,同事们也知道这些事,即便英伟达的行为准则并未明确禁止此类行为。《纽约时报》援引五名英伟达员工称,黄仁勋与一名直接向他汇报的副总裁有染,路透社随后援引两名知情人士报道了第二段关系。目前不清楚的是,这些信息是否传到了安全部门。

Eftimiades曾在2020年撰写《中国间谍活动与战术》一书,他表示,即便这些信息传到了英伟达安全团队,安全团队的资源往往也很有限。一方面,他们经常经费不足,因为与其他一些成本中心不同,他们不直接创造收入。他说,首席执行官们用“不多花一分钱,只做合规要求的事”来回应安全团队的警告,这种情况惊人地普遍。

专家表示,许多公司对安全的定义也过于狭隘。在企业调查公司Interfor International首席执行官Don Aviv和作家Jeremy Hurewitz发表于《国会山报》的评论文章中,两人写道:“太多公司仍然主要将安全视为保护设施、防范网络攻击和应对人身威胁的问题。”两人认为,“安全团队需要更加关注内部威胁,包括外国情报机构对高管和员工的拉拢培养、可疑的商业关系、利益冲突,以及通过可信的个人关系获取敏感信息的企图。”

尽管如此,有些事情超出了任何团队的能力范围。Eftimiades在一般性讨论中(并非针对黄仁勋)提出了一个假设情景:一位首席执行官抱怨自己无法做某件事,因为“我在跟一个不想做这件事的董事会斗争”。这就告诉情报资产谁是障碍。情报机构随后会问:“谁是这里的关键阻力?”然后寻找进入此人电子邮件和手机的途径。

对手情报机构想要的往往不是技术,而是政策洞察,包括谁在推动改变出口规则、谁是最大的阻碍者。“情报世界往往像癌症一样,”他说。“一旦进入体内,它就会寻求扩散,寻求向外延伸。”

Eftimiades补充说,这套路并不新鲜,“尤其是对中国而言”。任何与该国打交道的髙管“都会告诉你,他们曾被接触过”。他说还有“大量外交官的故事”,美国外交官走进酒店房间发现床上有个女人。他说,与苏联时代的间谍活动相比,更新的一点是,这些机构如今培养的关系往往持续数年,而非数周。

Eftimiades表示,技术可以增强人力情报,他举例指出了IMSI捕获器。这些设备模仿手机基站,使附近的手机连接上去。他说,基础版本成本约1000美元,可装入手提箱,不过政府级别的型号要贵得多。

Eftimiades说,目前没人知道这些设备是否被用于针对黄仁勋,后者的手机想必经过了加固处理,即便无法完全阻止入侵,也能检测到。但无论如何,随着董事会独立调查和联邦调查的推进,英伟达安全团队了解什么、是否本可以采取行动,应该会变得更加清晰。

与此同时,Eftimiades表示他希望整个事件能给美国业界敲响“警钟”,他说业界对中国的战术大多“一无所知”。“我们已经在知识产权上损失了数万亿美元,”这是他的估计。“无论我们自以为在做什么,都没有奏效。”

英文来源:

Outsiders had little reason to notice when Nvidia’s longtime chief security officer and head of product security stepped down in August. Just two and a half months later, CEO Jensen Huang himself left the company over growing questions about his extramarital relationships — starting with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China, then widening to reports about two separate affairs with Nvidia employees.
At the time, David Reber, who spent four years as CSO and seven at Nvidia overall, said he was leaving for health reasons. “This wasn’t a pivot I had planned. But I know what needs to come first: family and health,” he wrote on LinkedIn in late August, disclosing that he’d been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson’s more than two years ago.
Reber’s replacement, Saša Zdjelar, previously spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston, leaving as a senior IT manager before spending one year at Salesforce and several years at the cybersecurity company ReversingLabs. Zdjelar didn’t respond to questions Thursday about the transition or what the security team knew.
Nothing public connects Reber’s or Zdjelar’s role changes to the Megaspeed matter, but it seems fair to wonder what Nvidia’s security team knew about the government’s scrutiny of Megaspeed and about Huang’s relationships, and whether anyone raised concerns. Reber didn’t respond to questions Thursday. Nvidia also has not answered our related questions.
Relationships between a CEO and his employees typically fall to HR, legal and the board, not security. But security specialists say any affair — even one inside the office — can give a foreign intelligence service leverage over an exec who wants it kept quiet. And Huang’s relationship with an executive at Megaspeed, a company under federal investigation, wasn’t an office matter at all. (Megaspeed has denied any wrongdoing.)
Still, spotting the clues isn’t easy. The way intelligence services collect information, much of it through everyday conversation rather than hacking, makes it especially difficult for security teams to identify risks, according to retired senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades, who says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals.
Some people inside Nvidia clearly knew parts of the picture. Nvidia’s top lawyer was engaged with the government’s Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago, The New York Times reported earlier this week. (Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials.) Reports about Huang’s relationships with employees suggest colleagues also knew of them, even if the behavior is not expressly forbidden by Nvidia’s code of conduct. The Times cited five Nvidia employees who said he was involved with a vice president who reported directly to him, and Reuters, citing two people, later reported a second relationship. What’s unclear is whether any of that reached security.
Even if it had reached Nvidia’s security team, Eftimiades, who wrote Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics in 2020, said a security team’s resources are often limited. For one thing, they’re often underfunded because, unlike some other cost centers, they don’t drive revenue. It’s astonishingly common for CEOs to answer a security team’s warnings with “not a nickel more than compliance,” he said.
Many companies also define security overly narrowly, specialists say. In an opinion piece in The Hill, Don Aviv, CEO of the corporate investigations firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz, wrote, “Too many companies still approach security primarily as a matter of protecting facilities, preventing cyberattacks, and responding to physical threats.” The two argued that “[s]ecurity teams need to pay greater attention to insider threats, including the cultivation of executives and employees by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts.”
Still, some of it is beyond what any team can do. Speaking generally, not about Huang, Eftimiades offered a hypothetical in which a CEO complains that he can’t do something because “I’m fighting a board who doesn’t want to do this.” That tells an intelligence asset who the obstacle is. The service then asks, “Who’s the sticking point here?” and looks for ways into that person’s email and phone.
What a rival intelligence service wants is often less technology than policy insight, including who’s pushing to change export rules and who the biggest blocker is. “Intel world tends to be like cancer,” he said. “Once it gets into the body, it looks to spread and looks to reach out.”
The playbook isn’t new, Eftimiades added, “particularly for China.” Any executive dealing with the country “will tell you that they’ve been approached.” He said there are also “tons of diplomat stories” of U.S. diplomats walking into a hotel room to find a woman on the bed. He said what’s newer compared with Soviet era spying is the relationships these services cultivate now often last years, not weeks.
Technology can augment that human intelligence, Eftimiades said, pointing to IMSI catchers are one example. These devices mimic a cell tower so that nearby phones connect to them. A basic version can cost about $1,000 and fit in a suitcase, he said, though government-grade models cost far more.
Eftimiades says no one knows yet if these were used against Huang, whose phone was presumably hardened such that compromises could be detected, if not stopped altogether. But either way, what Nvidia’s security team knew, and whether it could have acted on it, should become clearer as the board’s independent investigation and federal inquiries proceed.
In the meantime, Eftimiades said he hopes the whole episode is “a wake-up call” for U.S. industry, which he said is mostly “clueless” about China’s tactics. “We have lost trillions [of dollars] in intellectual property,” is his guess. “Whatever we think we’re doing isn’t working.”

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